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THE NATIONAL SPECIFICITY 
OF TOP MANAGEMENT TEAMS
The authors examine top management performance in modern corporations operating in market economies. 
They analyse the national differences between institutions of formal company management, the value and com­
petence systems of top managers as well as prevailing decision making practices. In their view, there is a clear 
difference in the power and strategies of managerial teams, reflecting the market and company differences 
between countries.
This paper discusses performance characteristics and dif­
ferences at top management level of modern corporations 
operating in market economies. First, we will discuss 
national differences in formal corporate governance, 
which are institutionally constituted: e.g. one-tier versus 
two-tier board systems, the powers, size and composition 
of the board, the duties and responsibilities of the indi­
vidual board members et cetera. Secondly, the socially 
constructed values and competences of top managers will 
be explored - above all with reference to the educational 
system - and, again, tentatively linked with economic 
performance. Thirdly, we will discuss the different desi- 
cion-making processes within top management teams as 
they are regulated by different „rules of the game“, which 
emerged before and during the era of industrial capital­
ism. As opposed to formal corporate governance, one 
could label the managerial values, competences and 
„rules of the game“ as informal governance.
In outlining the connections between social institu­
tions, top management teams and firm performance, a 
tentative link will be made between the theoretical 
perspective of the business systems approach and the re- 
source-based view of the firm. More specifically the 
impact of (attributes of) management teams on firm 
performance and survival will be hypothesized. After all, 
the resource-based perspective aims at explaining diffe­
rences in efficiency and effectiveness of economic actors. 
We attempt, then, to asses the influence of informal and 
formal governance systems and institutional features on 
the discretion and qualities of management teams and on 
the spread and level of these teams' attributes, which are 
an important factor in relation to firm performance.
FORMAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
Since the organization of markets and firms varies across 
nations, the powers, composition and strategies of top 
management teams -  being an element of the former -  do 
vary as well. The different ways of structuring economic 
activities in and between firms are widely believed to be 
a result of different paths to industrialisation and of the 
related differences in institutions such as the state, the 
financial, educational and labour systems.The same, thus, 
applies to national specific features of top management 
teams. In stead of converging to, say, the US system of 
one-tier corporate boards with CEO duality, high man­
agement mobility, and a focus on opportunistic diversifi­
cation aiming at short-term profits, one might expect per- 
sistance of variations at the strategic apex of modern cor­
porations in market economies.
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Whitley (1996) has tried to identify the major features 
of firms as economic actors varying significantly across 
market economies and of the social institutions that influ­
ence these characteristics. As top management teams are 
the principal agents -  de jure, for sure, but also to a large 
extent de facto -  of at least the larger firms in the major­
ity of the capitalist countries, his analysis is also of 
importance for ours. Economic actors differ on two major 
characteristics, subdivided in five variables:
A. Nature of activities and resources coordinated and 
controlled
Diversity of activities and capabilities coordinated 
through authoritative coordination 
Extent of radical discontinuities in activities and 
capabilities over time
B. Governance structures
Isolation of economic actors from other organizations 
and agencies
Delegation of control to salaried managers 
Dominance of growth goals with weak profit con­
straints
The socio-institutional features which affect these firms 
characteristics amount to nine variables, clustered in four
groups:
A. Cultural conventions
Strength of institutions governing trust relations and 
extra-family collective loyalties
B. State structures and policies
Extent to which the state dominates the economic 
system
Level of state risk-sharing with private economic 
actors
State support for intermediate associations and inter­
firm cooperation
Formal regulation of market boundaries, entry and 
exit
C. Financial system
Credit-based financial system
D. Labour system
Significance of the labour movement in strategic 
decision-making
Centralization of bargaining and negotiation 
Collaboration in skill training and certification
There is only one firm variable, above, which direct­
ly reflects formal governance with regard to top manage­
ment teams: „Delegation of control to salaried manager- 
si. Other features, however, indirectly influence formal 
governance or relate to corporate strategies and, thus, are 
illuminating as well. They will be discussed below.
The synonym for „Delegation of control to salaried 
managers“ is „managerial discretion from owners“. We 
consider this to be a very important dimension, because 
managerial discretion above all reflects the degree to 
which organizational outcomes will reflect the values, 
attitudes and capabilities of top management (See also 
table 2).
Theoretically, one could construct a continuum with 
total and nihil discretion at the extremes, but that would 
only result in an insipid concentration around the mean. It 
is more useful to regard real-life governance arrange­
ments. Leaving subtleties aside, one recognizes in the 
capitalist world a limited number of legal arrangements 
concerning this seperation of ownership and control in 
organizations (Consult Maitland, 1985, and, for the 
Westem-European scenery, Randlesome, 1990).
One major distinction is that between one-tier and 
two-tier corporate boards. One-tier boards consist of both 
executive and supervisory members -  and the latter ones 
are supposed to control the former ones on behalf of the 
owners. In two-tier boards, these responsibilities are sep­
arated in two different entities: an executive and a super­
visory board. Both in the one-tier and two-tier system the 
delegation of control to salaried managers can be exten­
sive or limited (e.g. Dalton et al., 1988). This depends on 
the power balances which are variously formalized across 
nations, and across different industries and types of firms 
within those nations. The rights, duties, composition and 
„tacit obligations“ of Dutch and German supervisory 
boards, for example, do differ significantly. Whereas 
Dutch supervisory board members are appointed by 
cooption and are supposed to serve the interests of the 
company as a whole (van Iterson and Olie, 1992), their 
German counterparts are appointed by the shareholders or 
the workforce and are expected to represent the interests 
of the specific group by which they are chosen (e.g. Olie, 
1996). Within the German context, the supervisory board 
characteristics can differ from industry to industry: work­
ers4 representatives in the Aufsichtsrat of firms in the 
coal, mining and steel industry (the so-called 
Montanindustrie) are elected by the works councils, 
whereas in other industries they are elected directly by the 
employees (e.g. Chmielewitz, 1990). As to one further
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lower level of aggregation -  that of the (type of) firm - 
-Lane has argued that owner control is low in larger 
enterprises, but high in small- and medium-sized firms 
(Lane, 1992: 91). This is explained by the high incidence 
of family-managed craft enterprises among the German 
SMEs. Family-dominated management usually means: 
preciously little delegation of control. This applies 
regardless of the size of the firm: think of the Korean 
chaebol and the large Latin-European family firms.
As a result of these differences in controling power, 
the discretion of the executive boards - which interests us 
most, since they form the dominant coalition of decision­
making - show considerable international and intrana­
tional variation as well. The same argument applies to the 
executive members4 discretion in one-tier systems. The 
powers and backgrounds of supervisory or „silent“ board 
members vary between nations, industries within nations 
and types of firm within nations. Also, the ratio between 
both groups of directors is in some countries legally 
determined, such as in France, where two thirds of the 
unitary boards must be members who are not in the 
employ of the firm. Therefore, it is imperative to assess 
the exact power balance in the nation/industry/type-of- 
firm combination at hand.
A second major distinction relates to the distribution 
of power within the board of directors. Regardless of the 
board system -  unitary or dual - , executive power can be 
concentrated in the hands of the chairperson or be more 
equally spread among the top management team. In the 
United States „there is an all-powerful chairman [...] who 
controls the agenda, the presentations, the discussions, 
and often the selection of the directors themselves“ 
(Dayton, 1984: 37). This also applies for most of the larg­
er British and French firms. Above that, in many coun­
tries the chairperson of the board is also enthrusted with 
the role of the highest position in operational line man­
agement. This CEO duality is custom in Anglo-Saxon 
countries, but can also be found in countries with a two- 
tier system. It is argued that in Germany, noted for its col­
legial management where the chairperson is only a 
primus inter pares, top management of larger firms has 
shifted in the direction of greater centrality, which mani­
fests itself amongst others in de facto CEO duality 
(Bleicher and Paul, 1985).
In spite of these nuancing remarks, one can hypothe­
size the influence which national social institutions will 
have on the power distribution between executive man­
agers, supervisors and owners. As one can see from Table 
1, which summarizes Whitley's systematization of
explanatory causes, delegation of control to salaried man­
agers is low i) when the institutions governing trust and 
loyalties are weak and ii) when the state plays not a dom­
inant role in structuring economic activities. Furthermore, 
iii) the delegation of control to salaried managers is lim­
ited in a credit-based financial system.
(i) The extent to which social institutions provide a 
foundation for extending trust to other economic 
actors (such as business partners or employees) has 
an important influence on the willingness to delegate. 
If owners of property rights do not feel able to rely on 
institutionalized procedures -  because they are 
judged as weak or unreliable - , personal and particu­
laristic connections become especially important. In 
stead of delegating discretion over economic 
resources to „strangers“ such as professional man­
agers, owners prefer to „keep it in the family4, as in 
Chinese family businesses (Redding, 1990). Thus, if 
the strength of institutions governing trust and non­
personal loyalties is weak, delegation of full control 
to non-family managers will be very unlikely . [Mind: 
it does not follow that strong institution unvariably 
lead to full delegation. See, for instance, ( iii), where 
a strong institution - namely, the banks -  contributes 
to less delegation to managers.]
(ii) When state commitment to coordinate economic 
development is strong, business dependency on the 
state will be high, and, consequently, the level of 
political risk among firms will be high as well, as in 
post-war South Korea and perhaps also France. 
Delegation to salaried managers will be low, because 
of the need to ensure compliance with state demands 
and to maintain secrecy.
(iii) In credit-based financial systems -  where capital 
is mainly mobilized and allocated through large 
financial institutions rather than through capital mar­
kets -  there will be a tendency to a diminished dele­
gation to salaried managers in comparison to capital- 
market systems. As owners and lenders in credit- 
based systems are locked into large financial institu­
tions, they are less likely to delegate full control to 
managers. Banks, insurance companies et cetera, in 
this regime, are more involved in strategic decision­
making and in the direct control of managers4 perfor­
mance than in capital-market based systems, thereby 
taking on an entrepreneurial function which goes at 
the detriment of managerial discretion.
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Table 1
Connections between institutions and economic actors
Institutional features Characteristics of economic actors
Diversity Discontinuous
goals
Isolation of 
Firms
Delegation to 
managers
Dominance 
of growth 
goals
Weak institutions governing trust 
Functional diversity and loyalties + + —
Low state risk-sharing + + + -
Dominant state - +
Formal regulation of markets - ' - -
State support for intermediate 
associations - - -
Credit-based financial system - - - limited +
Strong labour movement - +
Integrated, centralized 
bargaining — - -
Collaboration over training - - -
l Source: Whitley, 1996
I Let us turn now to other characteristics of economic 
s actors which vary in response to national institutional dif­
ferences, summarized in Table 1. „Diversity of activities 
] and capabilities coordinated through authoritative coordi-
i nation“ is encouraged when state risk-sharing is low, but
; discouraged when formal regulation of markets, state
3 support for intermediate associations, and collaboration
) of the labour movement over training are high, further-
i more, when firms operate in a credit-based financial sys-
i tern and when bargaining with unions is integrated and
) centralized. This feature of diversity, we argue, has
important implications for the composition and desired 
qualifications of top management teams. E.g. a higher 
level of diversification requires heterogeneity of func­
tional tracks and competences within the board. The 
[ influence of „Isolation of economic actors from other 
organizations and agencies“ on top management discre- 
I tion is unclear. Autonomy of economic actors from the 
state, financial institutions, the labour movement and col­
lective loyalties might indicate that the powers of salaried
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managers increase, but the same might apply also for 
owners. Whereas „Delegation to salaried managers“ 
increases managerial discretion directly and positive, 
„Isolation of economic actors from other organizations 
and agencies“ does so indirectly and possibly negative. 
Finally, „Extent of radical discontinuities in activities and 
capabilities over time“ and „Dominance of growth goals 
with weak profit constraints“ are rather strategic out­
comes and will therefore be touched upon below. The 
institutional influences on these characteristics of eco­
nomic agent, again, are summarized in Table 1.
INFORMAL CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE
AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
The informal* aspects of corporate governance include 
differences in the social origins and the making of top 
managers and in regulatory principles („rules of the 
game“) concerning top managements4 decision-making.
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During the past two decades, the social antecedents, 
education and training of (top) managers have been fair­
ly well documented and analyzed. Clearly, there are con­
siderable national differences in the chances of members 
of different social groups to pursue a managerial career. 
Also, there are different educational paths to upper eche­
lon functions in different countries. In Anglo-Saxon 
countries, selfmade men from middle and lower social 
strata have, from the very beginnings of their nation's 
industrialisation, made their way to leading positions in 
firms. In many continental European countries, the 
chances were -  and still are -  much less equally spread 
among classes. The educational system supports and rein­
forces democratic or elitist patterns of management 
career possibilities. The distinction between unitary and 
dual education and training systems -  as many authors 
have demonstrated -  accounts for pervasive differences at 
top management level, both in functional differentiation 
and competences. The prevalence of „generálist“ man­
agers in one country and „specialist“ managers in anoth­
er can be seen in the light of differences in the national 
educational and training system. The kind of manager 
who will make it to the top appears to be very different 
indeed. For example in Germany, top managers have a 
predominantly engineering background, have followed 
more specialized career tracks and are generally older 
when they reach the top, and are characterized by longer 
organizational tenure than their colleagues in Anglo- 
Saxon countries like the United States and Britain (Lane,
1992). Although, once more, legal constraints play a role, 
here, it is above all the educational and training system 
that accounts for the differences. The consequences of 
these differences in terms of firms1 strategic change 
should not be underestimated. Lane (1992), for example, 
demonstrates thath the technical background of German 
management is an important factor to explain why growth 
by mergers and acquisitions, and horizontal diversifica­
tion, are significantly lower than in Britain.
Next to size, composition and powers of top manage­
ment teams and obligations and competences of individ­
ual board members, also idiosyncratic „rules of the 
game“ (Kristensen, 1997) regulating decision-making 
within top management teams might be explained with 
reference to socio-institutional variation. In some coun­
tries, such governance principles have found clear expres­
sion already in the late-medieval or early-modern era, 
such as in the Netherlands (van Iterson, 1997), but for the 
majority of the national market economies they have 
coincided with the introduction of steam technology and
the factory system (usually catched with the phrase 
„Industrial Revolution“). These rules of the game regu­
late the formation and interaction of social groups in a 
country, and thus also in domestic markets, organisations 
and networks. As an outcome one can observes also 
nationally distinctive patterns of coordination and deci­
sion-making, at all hierarchical levels in a firm, which can 
vary from e.g. „bureaucratic“ to „collegial“ to „paternal­
istic“ to „market-like“. To give an example of the first 
two: whereas in France, the logic of hierarchy and honour 
(cf. DTribame, 1989) dominates cooperation, competiti- 
ton and discours, in Germany it is rather (technological) 
expertise, exchanged among peers, which is highly 
esteemed in the contemporary German business system. 
' These differences between „la logique de 1‘honneur“ and 
„la logique communautaire“ (DTribame, 1989) can be 
traced back to early-modern social interaction between 
royalty, nobility and public servants at the -  centralized -  
court society in France and the -  decentralized -  court life 
in the German cities, as van Iterson, Mastenbroek and 
Soeters (1997) claim.
GOVERNANCE, INSTITUTIONS 
AND MANAGEMENT 
TEAMS' PERFORMANCE
In the last two paragraphes, we have sketched nationally- 
specific influences on top management teams by looking 
at three clusters of social-institutions:
legal governance of economic activities of firms 
antecendents, training and education of (top) man­
agers
the informal „rules of the game“ of decison making at 
strategic apex level
How can these influences be linked to the efficiency and 
effectiveness of companies? In the past years, much 
research attention has been devoted to the role of top 
management and its impact on the performance and 
strategic behavior of firms. Attention for the role of top 
management is of course not new, but the new approach­
es emphasize the importance of understanding the back­
ground, experiences and values of top managers in 
explaining the choices they make and the success they 
achieve (or the failure they face). Strongest proponents of 
this „upper echelon“ perspective are Hambrick & Mason 
(1984), who argue that organizational choices, such as 
product innovation, diversification, and acquisition 
strategies, as well as organizational performance, are 
determined by the views and characteristics of top man­
agement. Empirical studies seem to support this idea (e.g.
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Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Goodstein, Gautam & Boeker, 
1994; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992), but it must immediate­
ly be added that until recently, all empirical investigations 
into organizational demographics had been conducted on 
US organizations (Wiersema & Bird, 1993). Exceptions, 
by now, are the studies of Wiersema and Bantel (1992), 
who studied the impact of top management demography 
in Japanese firms, and of van Witteloostuijn, Boone, van 
Iterson and Olie (1997) on management of the Dutch 
newspaper publishers.
Most studies in this stream of research have used a 
demographic approach to measure top team members4 
cognitive perspectives. Important characteristics in this 
respect are age, sex, organizational tenure, functional and 
career experience, formal education, and socioeconomic 
background. These traits are considered to influence 
one‘s receptivity to change and willingness to take risks. 
In addition, demographic diversity at group level, which 
indicates the relative heterogeneity or homogeneity of a 
team, suggests the breadth of perspectives available in a 
decision-making process, and the creativity of this process.
Two theoretical perspectives have emerged from 
research of the relationship between team homogeneity or 
heterogeneity and their effectivity and effectiveness (cf. 
van Olffen, 1995). The „process facilitation perspective“ 
emphasizes the importance of homogeneity, whereas the 
„resource diversity perspective“ emphasizes the impor­
tance of heterogeneity. For example, similarity of back­
ground, joint experience, and common perspective pro­
vide a common vocabulary and the basis for mutual 
understanding. Thus, when members of a group share 
essential values and capabilities, that group will show 
more cohesion. This integration will have a positive effect 
on the frequency and effectiveness of interaction, and, as 
a result, on efficiency. On the other hand, homogeneous 
groups tend to be conformistic, thus less alert on environ­
mental threats and opportunities. In other words, homo­
geneous groups tend to be less effective. Heterogenous 
groups profit from the broader spectrum of views which 
their members cherish. This is the more valuable when 
the group is faced with complex problems which call for 
complex solutions that, by nature, are beyond the cogni­
tive capacities of an individual. Heterogenous teams will 
therefore be more innovative and creative than homoge­
neous groups, hence more effective. The drawback, here, 
is that the variety of skills, knowledge and values can eas­
ily hinder communication. The result can be an increase 
of conflicts and power struggle. Consequently, hetero­
geneous teams tend to be less efficient.
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As to average age and organizational tenure, it is 
argued that both a negatively correlated with willingness 
and capacity to innovate. One could indeed argue: the 
„older“ the teams -  in age and/or tenure -  the better they 
will „score“ on efficiency, whereas „younger“ teams will 
perform better in terms of effectiveness. However, this is 
still very speculative. This is even more applicable for 
functional background, training and education, and social 
antecedents. The connections between these factors and 
risk taking behaviour et cetera are hardly examined. So 
far, the research on homogeneous versus heterogeneous 
teams, as well as on the effect of psychological charac­
teristics of team members, such as the locus of control 
(e.g. Boone, de Brabander and van Witteloostuijn, 1996), 
has made more progress.
In this paper, we „only“ want to call attention for the 
fact that top managers4 characteristics (age, sex, organi­
zational tenure, functional experience et cetera) and team 
characteristics (homo-/heterogeneity) are to a consider­
able extent institutionally constructed and, therefore, 
nation specific. Next to reflecting market pressures and 
company idiosyncracies, these characteristics also reflect 
the three clusters of social institutions discussed above: 1) 
legal governance of economic activities of firms, 2) ante- 
cendents, training and education of (top) managers, and 
3) the national „rules of the game“ of decison-making. So 
far, this is neglected in top management team studies. By 
now, it is widely accepted that strategic choices of firms - 
e.g. regarding diversification into technically unrelated 
areas, which hardly occurs in Germany, but can be fre­
quently found in Great Britain -  reflect national charac­
teristics. Performance outcomes, however, have not yet 
been analyzed in this manner, to our knowledge.
As a first step, we suggest some overall linkages 
between social institutions on the one hand and top man­
agement teams characteristics and performance on the 
other (See Table 2). Finally, by way of illustration, we 
have chosen the Dutch business system to demonstrate 
possible linkages and performance consequences. These 
connections are summarized in Table 3.
If one is to translate this rudimentary overview of 
linkages to hypotheses, numerous possibilities emerge. 
We have selected only a limited number of more specific 
relations. These are presented in Table 3, and below via 
some additional hypotheses. The arrows between the 
columns of the table may also serve as hypotheses, to be 
tested in a comparative analysis, which will be the next 
step to undertake.
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Table 2
Social institutions influencing top management 
team characteristics
Social institutions Top management team characteristics and interaction
Formal governance:
Managerial discretion Degree to which organizational outcomes will reflect the values, attitudes and capa­
bilities of top management
One-tier vs two-tier boards
CEO duality 
Board size
Board composition 
(e.g. functional
Age, organizational tenure, functional and career experience, formal education, and 
thus also homo-/heterogeneity
Informal governance:
Social antecedents 
Training and education system
Age, sex, organizational tenure, functional and career experiences, formal education, 
socioeconomic background, and thus also homo-/heterogeneity
Rules of the game Influence on interaction in homo-/heterogeneous teams
Table 3
The social constitution of national 
management performance (I)
Informal and formal
systems of governance
Top management team 
characteristics
Performance features
Informal governance Top management: Major
system: rule of the game teams of unequals communication
problems
Decision-making via coercion High probability of conflicts and
Hierarchical principle of power struggle
governance through bureaucratic
control Authoritative or Efficiency rather than effectiveness
(„bureaucratic“) charismatic chairman
leadership
Higher average age and tenure of
Longer career tracks the board
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or: Top management: team of equals Limited
communication problems
Co-operative principle of gover­
nance through peer control 
('collegiali)
Decision-making via 
voting or consensus
Task- and/or group-oriented chair­
man leadership
Low probability of conflicts and 
power struggle
Effectiveness rather than efficiency
Shorter career tracks
Lower average age and tenure of 
the board
Formal governance system:
Legal form:
state-owned
family-owned
public limited liability firm
Delegation to managers:
low
low
medium to high
Low/limited external restriction of 
creativity in 
problem solving
Table 3
The social constitution of national 
management performance (II)
Social-institutional
features
Top management team 
characteristics
Performance features
Weak institutions governing trust and
loyalties
Delegation to managers: 
low
Creativity in problem solving ex­
ternally restricted
hence: efficiency rather than effec­
tiveness
Dominant state low idem
Financial system:
Credit-based medium idem (albeit moderated)
Labour unions and Enterprise 
Councils: idem
disruptive stand/unaccepted role 
or
Management embraces „outside“ 
perspectives
cooperative stand/accepted role
hence: effectiveness rather than 
efficiency
Educational system: 
unitary/dual
(No) sharp distinction between in­
tellectual and manual work
Positive/negative influence on 
functional team 
differentiation
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Some additional hypotheses:
Hypothesis l:Ceteris paribus (i.e. functional composition, 
social backgroun et cetera being equal), one-tier 
boards are more heterogeneous than executive boards 
in two-tier systems and will therefore „score“ better 
on effectiveness.
Hypothesis 2: Ceteris paribus functional composition, 
executive boards in two-tier systems are more 
homogenous than one-tier boards and will therefore 
„score“ better on efficiency.
Hypothesis 3: In nations with bureaucratic regulatory 
principles, career and functional experience of top 
managers will be more extensive than in nations with 
collegial regulatory principles
Hypothesis 4: In nations with bureaucratic regulatory 
principles, functional specialisation within top man­
agement teams will be higher than in nations with 
collegial regulatory principles
Hypothesis 5: In nations with a capital-based financial 
system there will be a greater tendency to delegate 
power to the chairman of the board than in a nation 
with a credit-based financial system (since it is sup­
posed to be important for shareholders that a corpo­
ration has a recognizable „face“ in the person of a 
CEO)
Hypothesis 6: In nations with a capital-based financial 
system there will be a greater probability that the 
board comprises a financial director than in a nation 
with a credit-based financial system
Hypothesis 7: In nations with little external recruit­
ment of managers and high internal promotion, based 
on age and seniority, boards will be more homoge­
neous than in nations with high external recruitment 
and limited internal promotion, based on age and 
seniority
Hypothesis 8: Firms employing financial experts in the 
board will show a higher propensity to diversify in 
unrelated areas than in firms without financial experts 
in the board.
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